tsliverhomenpm
Malicious code in tsliverhome (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
Package name 'tsliverhome' impersonates the widely-used 'tslib' package (~300M weekly downloads). The shipped README.md is a verbatim copy of Microsoft/tslib's README (titled '# tsliv', describing the TypeScript --importHelpers runtime library), designed to reassure a developer who mistyped the name. The actual code in index.js has no relation to tslib: the exported getPlugin() function issues an HTTP GET to https://verceljs-kappa.vercel.app/icons/23, JSON.parses the response body, and passes it directly to eval(). The destination is a generic Vercel preview-style host not tied to any declared publisher, is not version-pinned, and the fetched bytes are not hash- or signature-verified. Any consumer who imports this package and calls getPlugin() will execute arbitrary JavaScript under the control of whoever operates verceljs-kappa.vercel.app. Supporting signals: package.json ships placeholder metadata (empty description, empty author, no repository, no homepage), consistent with throwaway-publisher typosquat packages. The combination of (a) name-confusion with a top-tier target, (b) README impersonation of that target, and (c) a remote-fetch-and-eval payload in the exported API constitutes a deliberate supply-chain attack against developers who mistype 'tslib'.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for tsliverhome (4 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging tsliverhome across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
tsliverhome is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove tsliverhome, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If tsliverhome was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks tsliverhome before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks tsliverhome-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.