tslint-confnpm
Malicious code in tslint-conf (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
The package presents itself as the pino logger (README, index.d.ts, docs/, and lib/ files all reference pinojs/pino) but is published under the unrelated name tslint-conf. Its default export is an Express-style middleware factory whose invocation synchronously calls runJobA, which uses child_process.spawn("node", ["lib/caller.js",...], { detached: true, stdio: "ignore" }) followed by child.unref() to launch a hidden background worker. lib/caller.js performs axios.get against https://peach-eligible-penguin-917.mypinata.cloud/ipfs/bafkreigjnxn5vnn34rc5r43ajwwkmk4akqpm4awmq5gdhakgszpeqiffsu, takes the response body, and passes it to new Function.constructor("require", s) then invokes the resulting function with require, granting the fetched code full Node.js capabilities on the host. The remote content is attacker-controlled (Pinata account under the operator's control), unpinned by hash/signature, and executed unconditionally on every use of the middleware. Combined with the pino cover story, any consumer misled into using this package as their logger triggers remote code execution.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for tslint-conf (version 7.2.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging tslint-conf across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove tslint-conf from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If tslint-conf was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks tslint-conf before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks tslint-conf-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.