ts-opusnpm
Malicious code in ts-opus (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
ts-opus 0.0.8 ships an unmodified copy of MikeMcl/big.js (README, copyright, and repository URL all reference big.js) but injects an additional top-level block inside both big.js and big.mjs that calls require('node-slot') and invokes doc.from_str(), with both the synchronous error and the returned promise's rejection silently swallowed (try {....then(e=>{}).catch(e=>{}) } catch(error){}). The required module name node-slot is not declared in package.json — the declared dependency is the differently-named ref-slot — so the code intentionally loads an externally-resolved package whose contents are not controlled by this tarball. Any consumer who require('ts-opus') or imports big.mjs triggers loading and executing whatever node-slot resolves to at install time, with failures hidden from the user. The combination of (a) a cover-story package presenting itself as big.js, (b) require-time execution of an undeclared external module, and (c) silenced error handling to hide payload failures is a targeted supply-chain attack against consumers who believe they are pulling in big.js.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for ts-opus (version 0.0.8). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging ts-opus across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove ts-opus from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If ts-opus was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks ts-opus before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks ts-opus-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.