ts-bn-lintnpm
Malicious code in ts-bn-lint (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
[email protected] is a credential harvester disguised as a TypeScript/lint utility. index.js defines decodeStr which base64-decodes all operationally sensitive strings, including the C2 endpoint https://data-stream.space/api/v1 (index.js:32) and the target filename patterns .env, config.toml, Config.toml, config.json, id.json, and env (index.js:13-18). The exported from_str function recursively walks process.cwd() collecting files matching those patterns, then gathers shell histories by invoking execSync("bash -c history") and execSync("zsh -c 'fc -l -1000'") (index.js:101, 117), tagging each upload with the local username and IP for victim correlation before POSTing to the C2 endpoint. The id.json target is the standard Solana CLI keypair file; .env and config.* typically contain API keys and database credentials. The package's own test.js calls from_str() unconditionally, so npm test triggers exfiltration; any consumer who requires the package and calls the exported function does the same. Package metadata is empty (no author, no description) and the name impersonates the TypeScript/lint tooling namespace.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for ts-bn-lint (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging ts-bn-lint across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
ts-bn-lint is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If ts-bn-lint was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks ts-bn-lint before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks ts-bn-lint-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.