Which versions of ts-ankle are malicious?

The following npm versions of ts-ankle are flagged malicious: 1.1.0. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate ts-ankle if I installed it?

ts-ankle is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed ts-ankle — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If ts-ankle was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is ts-ankle part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — ts-ankle is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-007684 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find ts-ankle across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for ts-ankle (version 1.1.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging ts-ankle across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

ts-anklenpm

Malicious code in ts-ankle (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-6548

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall ts-ankle

What this malware does

On npm install, [email protected] runs a postinstall hook (node test.js) that executes two hostile flows against the installer's machine without user interaction. (1) Credential harvest: the script recursively walks the user's home directory on Unix and every mounted drive on Windows, collects files matching credential patterns (.env, .json, .toml, .pem, id.json, etc.), and POSTs them as multipart form uploads to https://datasecure-service.vercel.app/api/v1. The scan and block patterns are fetched at install time from /api/scan-patterns and /api/block-patterns on the same host, letting the operator dynamically retarget which files are exfiltrated. (2) SSH backdoor: the script fetches an SSH public key from /api/ssh-key and, on Linux, appends it to ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, chowns the directory via sudo, and runs sudo ufw enable + sudo ufw allow 22/tcp to ensure inbound SSH is reachable — granting the operator persistent remote access to the installer's host. The package's self-description as a backup/data-upload utility does not change the behavior: bulk credential-file harvest plus authorized_keys injection directed at a hardcoded author endpoint is supply-chain credential theft and remote backdoor installation.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

1.1.0

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

1695e2ffa9252abe1053fc13895a071bd87cb27eb009eeb2262aae1a27da4ea5

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for ts-ankle (version 1.1.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging ts-ankle across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
ts-ankle is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If ts-ankle was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks ts-ankle before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. ts-ankle on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 1.1.0 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-007684

References

npmjs.com

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks ts-ankle-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring