Which versions of tme-xca are malicious?

The following npm versions of tme-xca are flagged malicious: 3.0.0. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate tme-xca if I installed it?

tme-xca establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.

I already installed tme-xca — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If tme-xca was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is tme-xca part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — tme-xca is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-009877, GHSA-w846-5p2c-7hwq campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find tme-xca across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for tme-xca (version 3.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging tme-xca across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

tme-xcanpm

tme-xca is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-10236) that opens a backdoor for remote access (malicious version 3.0.0). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

Malicious code in tme-xca (npm)

MAL-2026-10236

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall tme-xca

What this malware does

The tme-xca package was published to the npm registry by user 'click2ai' (maintainer email [email protected]) as part of a dependency-confusion / reconnaissance campaign. The package name mimics the internal/private package naming convention of a target organization (a 'tme' (Travel Mall / TME-style) internal namespace) so that a misconfigured resolver installs this public lookalike instead of the intended private dependency.

The package declares a preinstall hook ("npm install @sentry/node && node examples/verify.js") that executes automatically at npm install time, before any application code runs. The bundled examples/verify.js initializes the @sentry/node client against a hardcoded, attacker-controlled Sentry DSN with sendDefaultPii enabled, resolves the installing host's public egress IP address by requesting Cloudflare's /cdn-cgi/trace endpoint (using a spoofed desktop-browser User-Agent to bypass bot challenges), then deliberately triggers a runtime exception and captures it. Flushing the event beacons the collected host telemetry (public IP plus Sentry default PII such as hostname, OS username and runtime/environment metadata) to the attacker's Sentry ingest endpoint at o4510485815754752.ingest.us.sentry.io.

Each impersonated namespace in the campaign beacons to a distinct Sentry project ID, letting the operator attribute successful installs to specific victim organizations — behaviour consistent with a dependency-confusion reconnaissance beacon rather than legitimate error monitoring. The install-time payload is byte-for-byte identical across all packages published by this account, differing only in the package name and the target DSN. This package's beacon targets Sentry project 4511630928838656.

On npm install, the package's preinstall hook executes examples/verify.js, which initializes Sentry against a hardcoded author-controlled DSN (project o4510485815754752.ingest.us.sentry.io/4511630928838656), fetches the installer's public IP from Cloudflare's trace endpoint, attaches it as the Sentry user identity, deliberately throws to generate an event, and flushes upstream. Every install of this version transmits the installer's public egress IP and host-side error context to a fixed remote destination the installer did not choose. Separately, src/index.js hardcodes the same DSN as DEFAULT_DSN and enables sendDefaultPii: true; consumers who call the advertised init/check/reportError API without supplying their own DSN or setting SENTRY_DSN silently route their captured exceptions and PII into the author's Sentry account. The relay is not the documented purpose of an error-reporting helper, and the destination is hardcoded to the author rather than configured by the installer.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

3.0.0

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

6012c6bcd17a7184340cb8ed6dc94d58d97b92826c0f510d81ddebd4160d86f0

4cffe7c45caa14f5fde24d0d15f3a70cd54521b6a1c520727784cb898bf8e2e1

Detection & response playbook

Backdoor / remote access

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for tme-xca (version 3.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging tme-xca across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
tme-xca establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If tme-xca was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks tme-xca before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. tme-xca on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 3.0.0 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-009877GHSA-w846-5p2c-7hwq

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder
SafeDep · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks tme-xca-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring

Explore

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