tme-errornpm

The tme-error package was published to the npm registry by user 'click2ai' (maintainer email [email protected]) as part of a dependency-confusion / reconnaissance campaign. The package name mimics the internal/private package naming convention of a target organization (a 'tme' internal namespace) so that a misconfigured resolver installs this public lookalike instead of the intended private dependency.

The package declares a preinstall hook ("npm install @sentry/node && node examples/verify.js") that executes automatically at npm install time, before any application code runs. The bundled examples/verify.js initializes the @sentry/node client against a hardcoded, attacker-controlled Sentry DSN with sendDefaultPii enabled, resolves the installing host's public egress IP address by requesting Cloudflare's /cdn-cgi/trace endpoint (using a spoofed desktop-browser User-Agent to bypass bot challenges), then deliberately triggers a runtime exception and captures it. Flushing the event beacons the collected host telemetry (public IP plus Sentry default PII such as hostname, OS username and runtime/environment metadata) to the attacker's Sentry ingest endpoint at o4510485815754752.ingest.us.sentry.io.

Each impersonated namespace in the campaign beacons to a distinct Sentry project ID, letting the operator attribute successful installs to specific victim organizations — behaviour consistent with a dependency-confusion reconnaissance beacon rather than legitimate error monitoring. The install-time payload is byte-for-byte identical across all packages published by this account, differing only in the package name and the target DSN. This package's beacon targets Sentry project 4511621197856768.

package.json declares a preinstall hook that runs examples/verify.js on every npm install. verify.js calls the library's init() using a hardcoded DEFAULT_DSN in src/index.js pointing at the author's Sentry ingest project (o4510485815754752.ingest.us.sentry.io/4511621197856768), resolves the installer's public IP via a Cloudflare trace and sets it via Sentry.setUser({ip_address}), then deliberately triggers a TypeError so Sentry.captureException uploads an event with sendDefaultPii:true — sending the installer's public IP, hostname, username, and Node runtime metadata to the author's Sentry account at install time, without opt-in. Separately, src/index.js exports init() with the same hardcoded DEFAULT_DSN as its fallback: any consumer that calls init() without supplying options.dsn or SENTRY_DSN silently routes all captured exceptions (with sendDefaultPii enabled) to the author's Sentry project rather than the caller's. The consumer believes they are configuring their own error reporting; the destination is author-controlled.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.