tipsen-poc-againnpm
Malicious code in tipsen-poc-again (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
package.json declares its sole runtime dependency safe-chain-test as an HTTPS tarball URL pointing at a trycloudflare.com quick-tunnel host (https://dominant-vary-ran-americas.trycloudflare.com/safe-chain-test-1.0.0.tgz). trycloudflare quick-tunnel hosts are anonymous, ephemeral, publisher-unattributable, and fully mutable — the operator can serve arbitrary bytes to any installer at any time, and the bytes are not subject to npm registry scanning. On npm install, npm fetches this tarball and installs it into the dependency tree; whatever lifecycle scripts or top-level code the current tarball contains will execute on the installer's machine. This is a transitive code-delivery channel routed through an attacker-controlled hop that bypasses registry integrity controls.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for tipsen-poc-again (version 1.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging tipsen-poc-again across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove tipsen-poc-again from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If tipsen-poc-again was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks tipsen-poc-again before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks tipsen-poc-again-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.