tiny-folder-treenpm
tiny-folder-tree is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-15907) that executes malicious code on install (malicious version 0.1.0). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in tiny-folder-tree (npm)
What this malware does
[email protected] declares a postinstall script (src/build.js) that runs on npm install. The script performs a DNS TXT lookup for spreadsheets-documents.com and, when the first character of the first TXT record is '1', invokes src/tools.js which issues an HTTPS request to a URL reconstructed at runtime from obfuscated numeric constants in src/const.js (base-77/base-45 encoded strings decoding to 'https' and an 'HTTPS://...' URL). The response's 'm' header is passed directly to child_process.execSync, yielding arbitrary attacker-controlled shell execution on the installer's machine. The require target for the HTTPS module and the destination URL are both reconstructed via helpers (normalize_hash / normalize_hash_map) to evade static analysis. An author-username bypass ('justin') skips execution on the author's own host, confirming the code is intended to fire on other installers rather than the maintainer.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for tiny-folder-tree (version 0.1.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging tiny-folder-tree across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove tiny-folder-tree from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If tiny-folder-tree was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks tiny-folder-tree before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks tiny-folder-tree-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.