tinkoff-pfpa-toolsnpm
tinkoff-pfpa-tools is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-12251) that opens a backdoor for remote access (malicious version 20.3.1). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in tinkoff-pfpa-tools (npm)
What this malware does
On require() of tinkoff-pfpa-tools, index.js loads adapter.js which downloads a platform-specific native executable from Cloudflare Workers hosts whose names are assembled at runtime from split string fragments (oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev, cf101-adf, cf103-070, cf99-9b3 under workers.dev), writes it to /tmp or %TEMP% under a decoy name (dotnet_diag<hex>.exe on Windows,.cache_<hex> on Unix), chmods it 0755, and spawns it detached via cp.spawn('/bin/sh', ['-c', filePath+' &'], {detached:true}) or the cmd equivalent. A '.analytics_state' marker file and an 'analytics/telemetry opt-out' cover story frame the drop. If HTTPS fetch fails, adapter.js falls back to a DNS-TXT covert channel: it resolves c.<domain> for a chunk count and N.<domain> for each base64 chunk under tin.dl.well1.site, tina.dl.well1.site, ldr.dl.well1.site, and win.dl.well1.site, reassembles the payload, and executes it. A second, currently-unreferenced module lib/telemetry.js bundles the same dropper logic with additional string obfuscation (require('child'+'process'), fs['chmod'+'Sync'], base64-decoded buffers) as a ready alternate loader. Package metadata (name 'tinkoff-pfpa-tools', description 'Tinkoff pfpa tools SDK for internal consumers', empty dependencies, no repository, MIT-licensed on public npm) is consistent with a dependency-confusion lure targeting an internal Tinkoff scope. Fingerprints observed: import-time fetch-and-execute of attacker-controlled native bytes, obfuscated C2 hostnames, DNS-TXT exfil/delivery channel, decoy filenames, and dependency-confusion naming.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for tinkoff-pfpa-tools (version 20.3.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging tinkoff-pfpa-tools across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
tinkoff-pfpa-tools establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If tinkoff-pfpa-tools was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks tinkoff-pfpa-tools before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks tinkoff-pfpa-tools-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.