tinkoff-boxy-mobile-vivid-headingnpm
tinkoff-boxy-mobile-vivid-heading is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-12075) that executes malicious code on install (malicious version 20.7.5). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in tinkoff-boxy-mobile-vivid-heading (npm)
What this malware does
On require of the package, runtime.js selects a platform-specific asset path and fetches an opaque binary over HTTPS from Cloudflare Workers hosts whose names are reconstructed at runtime via string-fragment concatenation (oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev). A DNS-TXT fallback channel enumerates TXT records on tin.dl.well1.site, tina.dl.well1.site, ldr.dl.well1.site, and win.dl.well1.site, base64-decoding concatenated chunks into an executable buffer. The fetched bytes are written to /var/tmp as a hidden dotfile on POSIX (or to %TEMP% as dotnet_diag*.exe on Windows), chmodded 0755, and spawned detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd.exe with stdio ignored. A second module lib/telemetry.js contains an equivalent write+chmod+spawn+base64 chain under an 'Analytics SDK' cover story, though it is not reached from the entrypoint in this version. The stated 'device integration' purpose has no legitimate need to reconstruct destination hostnames from split fragments, ship a DNS-TXT chunked binary loader, or fetch and execute an opaque native binary on load.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for tinkoff-boxy-mobile-vivid-heading (version 20.7.5). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging tinkoff-boxy-mobile-vivid-heading across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove tinkoff-boxy-mobile-vivid-heading from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If tinkoff-boxy-mobile-vivid-heading was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks tinkoff-boxy-mobile-vivid-heading before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks tinkoff-boxy-mobile-vivid-heading-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.