tinkoff-boxy-mobile-separatornpm
tinkoff-boxy-mobile-separator is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-12235) that typosquats a legitimate package to trick installs (malicious version 20.8.8). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in tinkoff-boxy-mobile-separator (npm)
What this malware does
On require() of tinkoff-boxy-mobile-separator, index.js loads init.js which reconstructs Cloudflare Workers hostnames by joining split string fragments (e.g. ['oob-worker.cf101-adf.worker','s.','de','v'].join('')), downloads a platform-specific opaque binary via https.get, writes it to /var/tmp or %TEMP% under a randomized hidden name (dotnet_diag*), chmods it 0755, and spawns it detached via spawn('/bin/sh',['-c',fp+' &']) or spawn('cmd',...). A DNS-TXT covert channel (c.<domain> for chunk count, N.<domain> for base64-encoded chunks reassembled with Buffer.from(parts.join(''),'base64')) provides a fallback payload retrieval mechanism. No hash or signature verification is performed on the fetched executable. A second, structurally identical dropper is bundled at lib/telemetry.js (not reached from the main require graph but present in the tarball). The package name impersonates the Tinkoff namespace; there is no legitimate SDK behavior in the shipped code.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for tinkoff-boxy-mobile-separator (version 20.8.8). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging tinkoff-boxy-mobile-separator across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
tinkoff-boxy-mobile-separator is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove tinkoff-boxy-mobile-separator, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If tinkoff-boxy-mobile-separator was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks tinkoff-boxy-mobile-separator before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks tinkoff-boxy-mobile-separator-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.