timmytuffknuckles9npm
Malicious code in timmytuffknuckles9 (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
Package is not a Node library — package.json declares main: sw.js, a browser Service Worker whose first line calls importScripts('./8cfc2/hgshm.js'). importScripts is undefined in Node, so require('timmytuffknuckles9') throws immediately. No preinstall, install, postinstall, or prepare lifecycle scripts are declared, so npm install does not execute any package code. The tarball contains a bundled web app (a Lucide-style web proxy/unblocker) with heavily obfuscated JS assets and a popup ad redirect to abdct.com, but those run only inside a browser that loads the Service Worker — not on the developer's machine. Separately, the tarball ships auto-publish.sh, a helper that rewrites package.json.name in a loop to timmytuffknuckles1 through timmytuffknuckles10 and runs npm publish for each, evidence that the publisher is using npm as a hosting/CDN-style namespace and mass-publishing near-duplicate package names. This script is not wired to any lifecycle hook and does not run on install. Routing to human review for registry-hygiene assessment (off-purpose use of npm + namespace spam + heavily obfuscated bundled assets) rather than installer-harm.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for timmytuffknuckles9 (version 1.1.7). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging timmytuffknuckles9 across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
timmytuffknuckles9 establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If timmytuffknuckles9 was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks timmytuffknuckles9 before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks timmytuffknuckles9-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.