thevoidnpm
Malicious code in thevoid (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
On install, postinstall.js performs an HTTPS request to void-relay.com carrying process.env contents along with host identifiers (process.platform, process.arch). The destination is not associated with any documented publisher SDK or runtime CDN, and the data exfiltrated (full environment variables plus host fingerprint) constitutes installer-side secret leakage. This matches the canonical hardcoded-C2 exfiltration shape: a lifecycle script (postinstall.js line 38) issues https.get to a hardcoded attacker-controlled host (void-relay.com, line 22) with environment data attached. Any developer or CI runner that installs this package will leak its environment (which routinely contains API tokens, cloud credentials, and CI secrets) to the attacker.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for thevoid (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging thevoid across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
thevoid is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If thevoid was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks thevoid before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks thevoid-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.