testpackage83npm
Advisory published Updated
testpackage83 is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-19938) that executes malicious code on install (malicious version 1.0.0). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in testpackage83 (npm)
What this malware does
The package's postinstall script downloads an executable from http://185.212.128.180/chromedriver.bat, writes it to ~/.celest/bin/chrome (or chrome.exe), sets it executable, and later launches it through puppeteer-core. The source is a bare IPv4 address over plain HTTP with no hash, signature, or version pinning, and the URL path is a Windows.bat named 'chromedriver' while the package frames the artifact as a patched Chromium. The same download-and-execute path is also reached from src/browser.js, which calls download() followed by puppeteer.launch({ executablePath }) on first library use, so require()/import of the package will fetch and run the binary even when the postinstall step is skipped via CELEST_SKIP_DOWNLOAD. The destination host is not associated with any legitimate Chromium publisher, and the operator of that host fully controls the bytes that are executed on the installer's machine.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Search your lockfiles and build artifacts for testpackage83 (version 1.0.0).
If you installed it — respond
Remove testpackage83 from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If testpackage83 was installed, its post-install payload may already have run. Removing the package does not undo that — check outbound connections and credential use from the install window onward.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks testpackage83-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.