testnpmnmpnpm
Malicious code in testnpmnmp (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
package.json declares "preinstall": "./scripts/postbuild", where scripts/postbuild is a 976,568-byte unsigned, unhashed, unversioned Linux ELF executable shipped in the tarball. The package's only JavaScript source (src/index.js) is a trivial stub that exports () => { console.log("hello") }, with the bundled output (dist/index.cjs.js) matching. Nothing in the package's stated Arweave/Warp-contracts wrapper purpose justifies a native executable, and the binary's embedded strings (LIBBPF_0.0, PTRACE, NETLINK, HTTP/1.1, USERPROFILE, RSA_PKCS1_, Ed25519) indicate credential-handling and network-agent capabilities rather than build tooling. On npm install, the binary runs with the installer's privileges before any user inspection; the JS stub is a cover for shipping and executing arbitrary native code. The package name testnpmnmp and stub source further indicate a throwaway dropper rather than a real library.
This package was compromised as part of the IronWorm campaign. This campaign executes a malicious binary payload during installation via a preinstall hook. The payload is a Rust-built infostealer that targets developer environments, scanning for and harvesting credentials related to cloud providers, object storage, databases, source-control, package registries, and AI developer tools. It also targets cryptocurrency wallets, specifically injecting a malicious JavaScript hook into the Exodus desktop wallet to capture passwords and recovery phrases. Furthermore, the malware exhibits worm-like behavior by stealing GitHub and NPM credentials to push malicious updates to the victim's repositories and publish trojanized packages, and it uses an eBPF-based kernel rootkit to hide its processes and network connections on Linux systems.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for testnpmnmp (version 1.0.21). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging testnpmnmp across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
testnpmnmp is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If testnpmnmp was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks testnpmnmp before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks testnpmnmp-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.