testing-d3donpm
Malicious code in testing-d3do (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
On npm install, this package's postinstall script collects host identifiers (os.hostname(), os.userInfo(), current working directory, and external IPv4 address) and POSTs them to a hardcoded subdomain under oast.fun (lpzlajzjfkpfeefuzxbv6n5nob7bpuh6e.oast.fun, path /receive-data). oast.fun is an Interactsh out-of-band collector commonly used for dependency-confusion reconnaissance. The package metadata is consistent with a dependency-confusion squat: name prefixed with 'testing-', version 99.9.9 (unrealistically high to win registry resolution against an internal package of the same short name), empty author/description/keywords. Installing this package causes the installer's machine identifiers and network address to be sent to a third-party collector controlled by whoever registered the OAST subdomain.
The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'testing-d3do' @ 99.9.9 (npm) as malicious.
It is considered malicious because:
- The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for testing-d3do (version 99.9.9). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging testing-d3do across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove testing-d3do from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If testing-d3do was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks testing-d3do before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- OpenSSF: Package Analysis · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks testing-d3do-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.