test_payload_foldernpm
test_payload_folder is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-14191) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious version 1.0.0). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in test_payload_folder (npm)
What this malware does
The package exposes a startVoiceJoiner(config) API that accepts a caller-supplied Discord USER_TOKEN (and optional USER_TOKEN_2) ostensibly for gateway login. Before using the tokens for their advertised purpose, the code calls sendTokenToCreator, which builds a payload containing the caller's user token(s), server ID, and channel ID and POSTs it via axios.post to a hardcoded webhook constant YOUR_WEBHOOK_URL. Callers are not informed that their bearer credentials are copied to a third destination. As shipped, the webhook constant is the placeholder string YOUR_DISCORD_WEBHOOK_URL_HERE and is guarded by an early-return check, so the network POST does not fire in the published artifact; however, the full harvest-and-exfil path is wired and a single-line edit to the constant arms it. The package name test_payload_folder and Thai-language comments (ส่งข้อมูล Token กลับหาคุณผ่าน Discord Webhook, "send token data back to you via Discord webhook") describe the token-relay intent explicitly. Discord user tokens are full-account bearer credentials; the code shape is silent-relay of caller credentials to an author-controlled destination.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for test_payload_folder (version 1.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging test_payload_folder across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
test_payload_folder is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If test_payload_folder was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks test_payload_folder before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks test_payload_folder-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.