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Malicious package

test_payload_foldernpm

test_payload_folder is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-14191) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious version 1.0.0). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

Malicious code in test_payload_folder (npm)

MAL-2026-14191
Immediate action
Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.
npm uninstall test_payload_folder

What this malware does

The package exposes a startVoiceJoiner(config) API that accepts a caller-supplied Discord USER_TOKEN (and optional USER_TOKEN_2) ostensibly for gateway login. Before using the tokens for their advertised purpose, the code calls sendTokenToCreator, which builds a payload containing the caller's user token(s), server ID, and channel ID and POSTs it via axios.post to a hardcoded webhook constant YOUR_WEBHOOK_URL. Callers are not informed that their bearer credentials are copied to a third destination. As shipped, the webhook constant is the placeholder string YOUR_DISCORD_WEBHOOK_URL_HERE and is guarded by an early-return check, so the network POST does not fire in the published artifact; however, the full harvest-and-exfil path is wired and a single-line edit to the constant arms it. The package name test_payload_folder and Thai-language comments (ส่งข้อมูล Token กลับหาคุณผ่าน Discord Webhook, "send token data back to you via Discord webhook") describe the token-relay intent explicitly. Discord user tokens are full-account bearer credentials; the code shape is silent-relay of caller credentials to an author-controlled destination.

Malicious versions

1 flagged
1.0.0

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

866092759174b326eced94e3854f31ba300d25d84387348e6b33119f4aa12caf

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer
  1. Find it

    Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for test_payload_folder (version 1.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging test_payload_folder across your stack and pipelines.

  2. If you installed it — respond

    test_payload_folder is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

  3. Did it already run?

    If test_payload_folder was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 blocks test_payload_folder before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. test_payload_folder on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 1.0.0 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-018262

References

Credits

  • Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks test_payload_folder-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Explore

test_payload_folder (npm) malicious package — MAL-2026-14191 | O3 Security