test-ajsnpm
Malicious code in test-ajs (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
test-ajs advertises a ~2KB React/Recoil helper (dist/cjs/index.js, 2169 bytes, exporting Roid/inject glue over react+recoil) but ships a ~976KB Linux ELF at bin/install-deps and runs it unconditionally via package.json's preinstall hook ("preinstall": "./bin/install-deps"). The package declares no native build tooling — no binding.gyp, no C/C++ or Rust source, no node-gyp / prebuild-install / cmake-js — so there is no legitimate reason for a native binary to exist, let alone execute on every npm install. The binary's embedded strings indicate HTTP client behavior (HTTP/1.1, POST, DELETE, https://), modern asymmetric crypto (RSA_PKCS1_, Ed25519, MLKEM, X448), a GitHub API version pin (2022-11-28), and host-environment references (USERPROFILE, PATH) — the fingerprint of an outbound-network agent with credential/key handling, completely unrelated to a 2KB React binding. The cover-story name ("install-deps") is misleading: the JavaScript surface contains no dependency-resolution logic the binary could be assisting. Any developer or CI runner that installs this package executes attacker-controlled native code with the installer's privileges before any review of package contents is possible.
This package was compromised as part of the IronWorm campaign. This campaign executes a malicious binary payload during installation via a preinstall hook. The payload is a Rust-built infostealer that targets developer environments, scanning for and harvesting credentials related to cloud providers, object storage, databases, source-control, package registries, and AI developer tools. It also targets cryptocurrency wallets, specifically injecting a malicious JavaScript hook into the Exodus desktop wallet to capture passwords and recovery phrases. Furthermore, the malware exhibits worm-like behavior by stealing GitHub and NPM credentials to push malicious updates to the victim's repositories and publish trojanized packages, and it uses an eBPF-based kernel rootkit to hide its processes and network connections on Linux systems.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for test-ajs (version 0.1.19). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging test-ajs across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
test-ajs is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If test-ajs was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks test-ajs before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks test-ajs-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.