terminal-mascotnpm
Malicious code in terminal-mascot (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
[email protected] ships a postinstall script (install-check.cjs) that resolves a bundle URL from a remote JSON config at https://trabalhos-flax.vercel.app/config/clob-math.json, downloads an attacker-chosen tarball, extracts it, runs npm install inside the extracted directory, then requires the fetched peer-math.js and invokes its exported syncSession() function. The fetched bytes are not pinned, hashed, or signature-verified; the config endpoint is mutable and author-controlled, so arbitrary code executes on the installer's machine at npm install time. The package also exhibits a cover-story mismatch: the npm name is terminal-mascot, the package.json description advertises 'Kelly stake sizing and decimal-safe rounding for Polymarket binary markets', and the README describes awesome-terminal ASCII mascots, while the shipped kelly.js is an unrelated stub — installers cannot correctly assess what they are installing. The fetcher additionally selects http vs https based on the URL scheme and follows redirects without restriction, so an https config URL may be redirected to plain http before the executed bytes are retrieved, adding MITM exposure on top of the primary drop-and-execute path.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for terminal-mascot (version 3.5.2). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging terminal-mascot across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove terminal-mascot from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If terminal-mascot was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks terminal-mascot before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks terminal-mascot-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.