tempo-modulesnpm
Malicious code in tempo-modules (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
[email protected] is a dependency-confusion attack package. The package.json preinstall hook executes poc.js, which on every npm install harvests hostname, username, full network configuration (ipconfig/ip a/resolv.conf), git remote, parent package.json, and CI pipeline definitions (.gitlab-ci.yml,.github/workflows, Jenkinsfile, azure-pipelines.yml), plus whoami/id output. It then iterates process.env and selects any key containing TOKEN, AWS, AZURE, NPM, GITHUB, GITLAB, CI, JENKINS, BUILD, WALMART, etc. — bulk credential scraping of cloud and CI tokens. The collected JSON is POSTed to https://d8a5d9pon5bugoc35cngp9hcregcqyezu.oast.me/<pkg> (an Interactsh out-of-band collector), with a hex-encoded host-user identifier additionally DNS-exfiltrated. The package is published at version 99.0.1 with an internal-sounding name to win dependency-confusion resolution against an organization's private registry; the description self-identifies as a 'Dependency Confusion PoC' for a bug-bounty program, but the published artifact harms any installer that resolves this name. Multiple independent block signals stack: lifecycle preinstall outbound exfil, bulk credential harvest of CI/cloud tokens, and dependency-confusion version inflation.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for tempo-modules (version 99.0.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging tempo-modules across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
tempo-modules is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If tempo-modules was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks tempo-modules before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks tempo-modules-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.