tailwind-container-queriesnpm
tailwind-container-queries is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-15903) that opens a backdoor for remote access (malicious version 0.1.1). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in tailwind-container-queries (npm)
What this malware does
On require of the package main, an appended eval(atob(...)) block in dist/index.js queries Ethereum RPC endpoints (eth.blockscout.com/api, 1rpc.io/eth) for the last transaction sent from the hardcoded address 0xa322E5f3D311D3080e6f0121063e9aDC2490Ef1a and decodes the tx.to field into two IPv4 addresses. It fetches XOR-encrypted payloads from http://<resolved-ip>:443/0x/cls and http://<resolved-ip>:443/0x/ls, decrypts them with hardcoded keys, eval's the first payload in-process, and launches the second via spawn('node', ['-e', <decoded>], {detached:true, stdio:'ignore', windowsHide:true}).unref() to leave a persistent detached Node process on the host. After execution the loader rewrites dist/index.js on disk to strip the eval block, removing the payload from the file to hinder later inspection. The package impersonates @tailwindcss/container-queries by copying its README verbatim and pointing the repository field at tailwindlabs/tailwindcss-container-queries. The on-chain C2 pointer lets the operator rotate destination IPs by publishing new Ethereum transactions, so the fetched code is fully attacker-controlled.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for tailwind-container-queries (version 0.1.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging tailwind-container-queries across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
tailwind-container-queries establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If tailwind-container-queries was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks tailwind-container-queries before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks tailwind-container-queries-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.