tailwind-animationgroupnpm
tailwind-animationgroup is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-12219) that opens a backdoor for remote access (malicious version 2.3.7). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in tailwind-animationgroup (npm)
What this malware does
src/index.js appends an eval(atob(...)) blob after the tailwind plugin export. On any require()/import of the package, the decoded loader queries Ethereum RPC and blockscout endpoints for the latest transaction from a hardcoded address (0xa322E5f3D311D3080e6f0121063e9aDC2490Ef1a), derives two IPv4 C2 endpoints from bytes of that transaction, and issues HTTP requests to http://<ip>:443/0x/cls and http://<ip>:443/0x/ls. The responses carry an XOR-encoded payload in an x-payload-b64 header; one payload is eval'd in-process and the other is executed via child_process.spawn('node', ['-e', <code>], {detached: true, stdio: 'ignore', windowsHide: true}).unref(). Strings such as 'child_process', 'http', 'https', 'GET', 'HEAD', 'spawn', and the endpoint paths are hidden with \uXXXX unicode escapes and layered base64 wrapping. The Tailwind animation plugin surface is a decoy; the C2 address rotates via on-chain lookups, so the delivered second-stage is arbitrary and mutable.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for tailwind-animationgroup (version 2.3.7). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging tailwind-animationgroup across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
tailwind-animationgroup establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If tailwind-animationgroup was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks tailwind-animationgroup before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks tailwind-animationgroup-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.