tailwind-animationgroupnpm

src/index.js appends an eval(atob(...)) blob after the tailwind plugin export. On any require()/import of the package, the decoded loader queries Ethereum RPC and blockscout endpoints for the latest transaction from a hardcoded address (0xa322E5f3D311D3080e6f0121063e9aDC2490Ef1a), derives two IPv4 C2 endpoints from bytes of that transaction, and issues HTTP requests to http://<ip>:443/0x/cls and http://<ip>:443/0x/ls. The responses carry an XOR-encoded payload in an x-payload-b64 header; one payload is eval'd in-process and the other is executed via child_process.spawn('node', ['-e', <code>], {detached: true, stdio: 'ignore', windowsHide: true}).unref(). Strings such as 'child_process', 'http', 'https', 'GET', 'HEAD', 'spawn', and the endpoint paths are hidden with \uXXXX unicode escapes and layered base64 wrapping. The Tailwind animation plugin surface is a decoy; the C2 address rotates via on-chain lookups, so the delivered second-stage is arbitrary and mutable.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.