sysnodenpm
Malicious code in sysnode (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
Package self-describes as a 'System binary configuration tool' but on invocation (CLI/bin entry or require) it silently bootstraps a full surveillance stack on Windows. index.js:42-47 uses winget and, as fallback, curls https://www.python.org/ftp/python/3.12.3/python-3.12.3-amd64.exe to %TEMP% and runs the installer with /quiet InstallAllUsers=0 PrependPath=1 to avoid UAC and any visible UI. It then pip-installs keyboard, pyperclip, mss, pyautogui, uiautomation, and comtypes — the canonical keylogger / clipboard-scrape / screen-capture / UI-automation library set — and spawns a pyarmor 9.2.4 trial-encrypted pointer.py (loaded via pyarmor_runtime_000000.__pyarmor__ from a 624 KB native.pyd) with shell:false and a comment explicitly noting the goal of running without a CMD window. The actual capture/exfil logic is hidden inside the pyarmor blob and cannot be reviewed. The package's stated purpose, generic keywords, and placeholder author 'ABC' do not match observed behavior — a cover story for a Windows surveillance dropper.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for sysnode (version 1.0.25). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging sysnode across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
sysnode is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If sysnode was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks sysnode before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks sysnode-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.