Which versions of sysdo are malicious?

The following npm versions of sysdo are flagged malicious: 1.0.0. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate sysdo if I installed it?

sysdo is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed sysdo — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If sysdo was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is sysdo part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — sysdo is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-018308 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find sysdo across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for sysdo (version 1.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging sysdo across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

sysdonpm

sysdo is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-14215) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious version 1.0.0). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

Malicious code in sysdo (npm)

MAL-2026-14215

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall sysdo

What this malware does

The package is published as a 'System binary configuration tool' but its actual payload is a Windows surveillance harness. pointer.py registers global keyboard hooks and hotkeys, captures clipboard contents via pyperclip, takes screenshots via mss/ImageGrab, and walks UI-automation trees to extract on-screen text, then POSTs the captured data to the hardcoded endpoint https://iq-sec.vercel.app/api which the installer did not configure. It creates borderless topmost windows with empty titles and a 'panic_exit' hotkey, and can inject text back into the active window via pyautogui, giving covert operator-assist capability on the installer's host. The npm entry point (index.js, invoked via the bin/start script) silently installs Python by first attempting winget and then downloading the python.org 3.12.3 installer to %TEMP% and running it with /quiet flags in comments explicitly framed as a 'Ghost Install (No UI, No Admin Popup)', and pip-installs the surveillance stack (pyperclip, keyboard, mss, pyautogui, pywin32, uiautomation). A bundled start_tool.vbs uses Shell.Application.ShellExecute with a hidden window (mode 0) to launch cmd.exe running pointer.py without a visible console. The declared purpose does not match the observed behavior, and the exfiltration destination is a hardcoded author endpoint rather than any installer-configurable target.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

1.0.0

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

bb784f77e0ba034d13e3ca39aa5f3f401ab659deaafbb0b28d880c21293bde33

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for sysdo (version 1.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging sysdo across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
sysdo is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If sysdo was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks sysdo before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. sysdo on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 1.0.0 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-018308

References

npmjs.com

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks sysdo-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring

Explore

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