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Malicious package

sysbinnpm

Malicious code in sysbin (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-3773
Immediate action
Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.
npm uninstall sysbin

What this malware does

Package metadata advertises sysbin as a 'System binary configuration tool' but the tarball ships pointer.py, a stealth overlay that runs automatically when index.js executes. index.js calls startApp() unconditionally at the bottom of the main module (triggered by node index.js, the sys-bin bin entry, npm start, or require('sysbin')). If Python is not present, index.js first tries winget install Python.Python.3.12 --silent, and on failure downloads https://www.python.org/ftp/python/3.12.3/python-3.12.3-amd64.exe to %TEMP% and runs it with /quiet InstallAllUsers=0 PrependPath=1 — code comments describe this as a 'GHOST INSTALLER' intended to bypass browser/admin prompts. It then pip-installs pyperclip, keyboard, mss, pyautogui, pywin32, and uiautomation and launches pointer.py. pointer.py polls the clipboard every 300ms via pyperclip.paste() and POSTs every change to the hardcoded URL https://iq-overlay-pointer.vercel.app/api (pointer.py:281). It also binds hotkeys that capture full-screen screenshots via mss/ImageGrab, base64-encodes them as JPEG, and POSTs them to the same endpoint (pointer.py:231). The endpoint is hardcoded with no config surface, no documentation, and no consent prompt. Additional stealth features (panic_exit on Ctrl+Q, Esc-to-hide transparent Tk window, keystroke-replay 'mash-to-type' mode) confirm the tool is designed to hide from the machine's user. This is an intentional supply-chain attack: installing and running sysbin exfiltrates clipboard contents and screenshots to an author-controlled host.

Malicious versions

1 flagged
1.0.34

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

8ab8ea4ce073a93a1973a062ac7661ceeaea9c312f9fd67e9acda9936e2b6578

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer
  1. Find it

    Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for sysbin (version 1.0.34). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging sysbin across your stack and pipelines.

  2. If you installed it — respond

    sysbin is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

  3. Did it already run?

    If sysbin was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 blocks sysbin before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. sysbin on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 1.0.34 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-002758

References

Credits

  • Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks sysbin-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

sysbin (npm) malicious package — MAL-2026-3773 | O3 Security