sync-grovenpm
sync-grove is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-10749) that typosquats a legitimate package to trick installs (malicious versions 1.0.0, 1.0.1, 1.0.2). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in sync-grove (npm)
What this malware does
Package.json declares "postinstall": "node setup.js", so setup.js runs automatically on npm install. The script assembles the strings shelljs and exec from base64 fragments at runtime, then fetches two plain-HTTP URLs on player.sweeprovider.org (/getKey.php and /generateRandomKey.php) whose values are stored as concatenated base64 fragments (securityKey1), decrypts the response with a hardcoded AES salt, and passes the resulting string to shelljs.exec on the installer's host. The package presents itself as a typosquat of sync-exec ("Synchronous exec with status code support"), and js/syncgrove.js mirrors the sync-exec implementation as a decoy. The combination of hardcoded remote HTTP endpoints, runtime-assembled module/method names, encrypted payload staging, and shell execution at install time is a supply-chain dropper: whatever command the attacker serves runs with the installer's privileges on npm install.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for sync-grove (3 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging sync-grove across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
sync-grove is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove sync-grove, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If sync-grove was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks sync-grove before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks sync-grove-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.