syft-acp-utilnpm
syft-acp-util is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-10767) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 1.0.0, 17.0.0). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in syft-acp-util (npm)
What this malware does
The syft-acp-util package was published to the npm registry by user 'ada8877' (maintainer email [email protected]) as part of a dependency-confusion / reconnaissance campaign. The package name mimics the 'syft-acp' internal/private package naming convention (an ACP component library) of a target organization, so that a misconfigured resolver installs this public lookalike instead of the intended private dependency.
The package declares a preinstall hook ("npm install @sentry/node && node examples/verify.js") that executes automatically at npm install time, before any application code runs. The bundled examples/verify.js initializes the @sentry/node client against a hardcoded, attacker-controlled Sentry DSN with sendDefaultPii enabled, resolves the installing host's public egress IP address by requesting Cloudflare's /cdn-cgi/trace endpoint (using a spoofed desktop-browser User-Agent to bypass bot challenges), then deliberately triggers a runtime exception and captures it. Flushing the event beacons the collected host telemetry (public IP plus Sentry default PII such as hostname, OS username and runtime/environment metadata) to the attacker's Sentry ingest endpoint at o4510485815754752.ingest.us.sentry.io.
Each impersonated namespace in the campaign beacons to a distinct Sentry project ID, letting the operator attribute successful installs to specific victim organizations — behaviour consistent with a dependency-confusion reconnaissance beacon rather than legitimate error monitoring. The install-time payload is byte-for-byte identical to the earlier 'click2ai' campaign, sharing the same Sentry organization (o4510485815754752) and a related ProtonMail maintainer identity, and differs only in the package name and target DSN. This package's beacon targets Sentry project 4511744089718784.
package.json declares a preinstall script that runs examples/verify.js. That script calls init() with a hardcoded DEFAULT_DSN pointing at o4510485815754752.ingest.us.sentry.io/4511744089718784 and sendDefaultPii:true, fetches the installer's public IP from Cloudflare's cdn-cgi/trace endpoint, sets it as the Sentry user ip_address, then deliberately triggers a TypeError so an event containing the installer's public IP, hostname, and stack context is uploaded to the author-controlled Sentry project on every npm install. Separately, src/index.js exposes an init() whose dsn resolution falls back to the same hardcoded DEFAULT_DSN when no dsn option or SENTRY_DSN env var is supplied, so consumer applications that call the advertised init() without an explicit DSN will route their captured exceptions and default PII to the author's Sentry project.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for syft-acp-util (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging syft-acp-util across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
syft-acp-util is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If syft-acp-util was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks syft-acp-util before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- SafeDep · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks syft-acp-util-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.