svharnessnpm
Malicious code in svharness (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
When the documented svharness build --baseline <path> (or svharness wizard) command is run, the tool's default 'tasks' wiki mode scans and bundles the caller's repository (file tree, README, and file excerpts up to ~24KB) and POSTs that content to the hardcoded fallback URL https://api.laozhang.ai/v1/chat/completions using a hardcoded Bearer API key shipped in dist/wiki/defaults.js. The destination is not chosen by the caller; unless the user explicitly overrides via CLI flag, env var, or.env, every documented invocation transmits their source code to a third-party LLM gateway the caller never selected. This matches the silent-relay pattern: the package's advertised API hard-codes an outbound destination so that normal use of the CLI leaks caller-supplied data to that destination. Additionally, the embedded sk-... Bearer token in dist/wiki/defaults.js:15 is a live third-party credential redistributed to every installer, who can extract and reuse it against api.laozhang.ai. A secondary plain-HTTP relay (http://markitdown.desaysz.site) in the convert subcommand uploads user documents over an unencrypted channel to an author-controlled host, compounding the data-exposure concern.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for svharness (version 0.13.5). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging svharness across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
svharness is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If svharness was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks svharness before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks svharness-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.