svgson-litenpm
Malicious code in svgson-lite (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
index.js exports an undocumented getPlugin() function which, when invoked, performs an HTTP GET to https://shorturl.at/147uq, JSON-parses the response body, and passes the response's model field directly to eval(). The URL is a mutable shortener redirect controlled by the package author and can be repointed to any JavaScript payload at any time, giving the author arbitrary code execution in the process of any consumer that calls getPlugin()(). The package's stated purpose is an SVG helper: package.json describes it as 'Tiny zero-dependency SVG helper for Node.js' and declares no dependencies, yet index.js requires the 'request' library and implements the fetch+eval path. The network+eval behavior is unrelated to SVG processing and is not mentioned in the README, keywords, or exports documentation. The mismatch between advertised purpose and shipped behavior, combined with the shortener-cloaked destination, is deliberate concealment of a backdoor surface.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for svgson-lite (7 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging svgson-lite across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
svgson-lite establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If svgson-lite was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks svgson-lite before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks svgson-lite-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.