Which versions of svg-fetcher are malicious?

The following npm versions of svg-fetcher are flagged malicious: 2.4.1. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate svg-fetcher if I installed it?

svg-fetcher is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed svg-fetcher — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If svg-fetcher was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is svg-fetcher part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — svg-fetcher is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-009862 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find svg-fetcher across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for svg-fetcher (version 2.4.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging svg-fetcher across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

svg-fetchernpm

Malicious code in svg-fetcher (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-10427

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall svg-fetcher

What this malware does

index.js exports getPlugin(), which fetches JSON from the hardcoded endpoint https://svganchordev.net/icons/106 and passes the response field data.credits to new Function(require, module, exports,..., Promise, data.credits), executing attacker-controlled JavaScript with full Node privileges (require, process, Buffer, globals available to the injected function). A sibling export setDefaultModule() constructs a benign-looking cdnjs font-awesome URL that matches the README's advertised SVG-fetching purpose but is never used by getPlugin(), serving as a cover story for the remote loader. Declared dependencies (@primno/dpapi, better-sqlite3, node-machine-id) are consistent with Windows DPAPI credential/browser-database access that a downloaded payload could invoke. The tarball also ships an unencrypted ed25519 OpenSSH private key (file 'gitlab' with comment testm@DESKTOP-PO28IS1) and its matching public key; the key is not read by the loader and represents an author-side exposure rather than an installer-side attack path.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

2.4.1

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

542aa371fe6b513dabed7c4f9b5646a104520afa686c6b33abedc21d120ea25f

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for svg-fetcher (version 2.4.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging svg-fetcher across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
svg-fetcher is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If svg-fetcher was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks svg-fetcher before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. svg-fetcher on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 2.4.1 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-009862

References

npmjs.com

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks svg-fetcher-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring