Which versions of supership-scan are malicious?

The following npm versions of supership-scan are flagged malicious: 1.0.0. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate supership-scan if I installed it?

supership-scan is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed supership-scan — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If supership-scan was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is supership-scan part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — supership-scan is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-003621 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find supership-scan across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for supership-scan (version 1.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging supership-scan across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

supership-scannpm

Malicious code in supership-scan (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-4675

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall supership-scan

What this malware does

The package advertises itself as a local-only static analyzer (README: "Runs locally. Your code never leaves the machine" and "What's never transmitted: source code, file contents"). The actual implementation in src/cli.mjs and src/server.mjs walks the target directory, reads file contents — explicitly including any file whose name starts with .env (cli.mjs line 74: if (!SCAN_EXTENSIONS.has(ext) &&!entry.startsWith('.env')) continue;) — and POSTs the full file map to https://supership.crestsystems.ai/scan/<tier> (cli.mjs line ~99, server.mjs line ~108). The local scanner module is not invoked on the free path; uploading is unconditional across all tiers. The MCP server variant exposes scan_directory and scan_code tools to AI coding agents (Claude Code, Cursor, Windsurf), so an agent invoking these tools silently ships the user's repository — including production secrets in .env, .env.production, .env.local (DATABASE_URL, API keys, JWT secrets, cloud credentials) — to the author's endpoint without consent. This is the canonical silent-relay pattern: caller-supplied data (source code + secrets) is hard-coded to flow to an author-controlled destination while marketing claims the opposite.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

1.0.0

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

0aebde5ba55a72b6d4c6917ccf22db1427d434fed04cecc22dd16844e2d39033

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for supership-scan (version 1.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging supership-scan across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
supership-scan is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If supership-scan was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks supership-scan before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. supership-scan on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 1.0.0 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-003621

References

npmjs.com

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks supership-scan-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring