subsearchnpm
Malicious code in subsearch (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
The package's main entry index.js is the only file of substance and is wrapped in obfuscator.io string-array + RC4 obfuscation that hides every literal (module names, URL octets, exec arguments). On require(), the deobfuscated code assembles a bare-IP HTTP URL by concatenating four octets via .concat('.'), performs an HTTP GET, writes the response body into os.tmpdir() via fs.writeFileSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), <name>), I.data, {flag:'w+'}), and immediately executes the dropped file with child_process.exec(..., {windowsHide:true, cwd: os.tmpdir()}). process.on('uncaughtException',...) is registered to suppress errors. package.json has empty description, empty author, no repository, no homepage — the package advertises no functionality; its only effect on import is the dropper. The bare-IP destination has no TLS, no pinning, and no signature verification, so the attacker can swap the executed payload at any time.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for subsearch (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging subsearch across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove subsearch from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If subsearch was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks subsearch before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks subsearch-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.