stripe-internal-utilsnpm
Malicious code in stripe-internal-utils (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
package.json declares a postinstall hook that auto-fires on npm install and performs reconnaissance + exfiltration against the installer. The inline node -e payload fetches the installer's public IP from api.ipify.org, executes id || ver && whoami && hostname via child_process.exec, and POSTs a JSON body containing the timestamp, USERDOMAIN/USERDNSDOMAIN/COMPANY environment variables, public IP, hostname, current working directory, and shell command output to a hardcoded interactsh beacon at lszakfghwnvxspyfcmaabd1css99rnq3w.oast.fun over HTTP. The package's own description self-identifies as 'Full RCE PoC -osama', and the package name impersonates the Stripe brand to lure installers into a name they would plausibly trust. Any developer or build system running npm install stripe-internal-utils leaks identifying host and user information to the attacker.
The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'stripe-internal-utils' @ 8.2.0 (npm) as malicious.
It is considered malicious because:
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The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity.
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The package executes one or more commands associated with malicious behavior.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for stripe-internal-utils (version 8.2.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging stripe-internal-utils across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
stripe-internal-utils is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If stripe-internal-utils was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks stripe-internal-utils before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- OpenSSF: Package Analysis · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks stripe-internal-utils-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.