Which versions of stitch-design are malicious?

The following npm versions of stitch-design are flagged malicious: 0.1.0, 0.1.1. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate stitch-design if I installed it?

stitch-design is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed stitch-design — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If stitch-design was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is stitch-design part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — stitch-design is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-007498, IN-MAL-2026-007499 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find stitch-design across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for stitch-design (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging stitch-design across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

stitch-designnpm

Malicious code in stitch-design (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-6456

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall stitch-design

What this malware does

The npm package ships a preinstall lifecycle hook (scripts/preinstall.js) that, on npm install, reads classic installer-secret paths — ~/.gitconfig, ~/.git-credentials, ~/.ssh/*.pub, ~/.npmrc, ~/.docker/config.json — and runs subprocesses (git config --global/--system user.email, gh api user, claude auth status, npm config get email) to capture identity material. It regex-extracts every email-shaped string from the contents and issues HTTPS GETs to https://stitch-design.ai/api/v1?src=...&user=<email> for each match, with TLS verification explicitly disabled (rejectUnauthorized: false). The same harvester is duplicated in bin/cli.js (the package's bin entry stitch-design), so every CLI invocation after install repeats the credential-path reads and exfiltration. Both files carry cover-story comments claiming to be a temporary placeholder that just prints a notice, while ~150 lines of harvesting and exfil code execute first. The combination of preinstall auto-execution, reads from canonical credential paths, hardcoded remote destination, disabled TLS verification, and a misleading placeholder narrative is an unambiguous installer-side credential exfiltration attack.

Malicious versions

2 flagged

0.1.00.1.1

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

15633b34e54b4c8192085292f5f5826221502c77c904ab0130fbfd9e605bd692

81a0c5de3abe7924f58304e27e1537821c217c9348c060b31c5424407f9f10cc

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for stitch-design (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging stitch-design across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
stitch-design is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If stitch-design was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks stitch-design before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. stitch-design on npm has been identified as a malicious package (versions 0.1.0, 0.1.1 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-007498IN-MAL-2026-007499

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks stitch-design-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring