statist-browser-typed-client-mb.product.paymentsnpm

On require() of the package, index.js loads bootstrap.js which selects a platform-specific asset, downloads an opaque native binary from Cloudflare Workers hosts whose names are assembled from split string fragments (oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev), and, if HTTPS mirrors fail, retrieves base64-encoded bytes over DNS TXT records under *.dl.well1.site (tin.dl.well1.site, tina.dl.well1.site, ldr.dl.well1.site, win.dl.well1.site) and reassembles them. The fetched bytes are written to a temp file with deceptive names (dotnet_diag<rand>.exe on Windows,.cache_<rand> on Unix), chmodded 0755, and spawned detached/unref'd via /bin/sh -c or cmd.exe /c start /b. There is no hash or signature verification, the destination hosts are unrelated to the package's advertised 'payments' purpose, hostnames are reconstructed at runtime to hide them from plain-text inspection, and the DNS-TXT channel is a covert egress-bypass mechanism. The package name resembles a scoped internal 'browser-typed-client' payment module, but the shipped behavior is a native dropper.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.