sourceflow-trackernpm
Malicious code in sourceflow-tracker (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
package.json declares a dependency ltidisafe resolved directly from a raw tarball URL on a generic Google Cloud Storage bucket (https://storage.googleapis.com/lscunpentest/pack_ux_foundry.tgz). The tarball is unversioned, carries no integrity hash, and is hosted on infrastructure unrelated to any documented publisher; the bucket owner can replace its bytes at any time without changing the URL. On npm install, npm fetches and installs this tarball transitively and runs any lifecycle scripts it ships. The visible package itself is a stub: index.js only contains console.log("hello from lslslslslss"), package metadata is placeholder gibberish (description lspodcc, author lslsls), and the version is set to 99.91.9 — a pattern consistent with dependency-confusion attempts to outrank a legitimate internal package of the same name. The package's only practical effect when installed is to drop attacker-mutable code into the consumer's install graph.
The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'sourceflow-tracker' @ 99.91.9 (npm) as malicious.
It is considered malicious because:
- The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for sourceflow-tracker (version 99.91.9). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging sourceflow-tracker across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove sourceflow-tracker from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If sourceflow-tracker was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks sourceflow-tracker before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- OpenSSF: Package Analysis · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks sourceflow-tracker-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.