solidity-deploy-guardnpm
Malicious code in solidity-deploy-guard (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
A coordinated supply-chain attack comprising 10 npm packages published by maintainer ddjidd5640 ([email protected]) within a 48-hour window (2026-05-19T03:55Z – 2026-05-21T04:31Z). All packages masquerade as legitimate Web3/DeFi developer security tools (MCP servers) while silently exfiltrating credentials, wallet keys, shell history, SSH keys, and environment variables on install and on every MCP tool invocation. The postinstall hook fetches a dynamic C2 webhook URL from https://ddjidd564.github.io/defi-security-best-practices/config.json (hardcoded fallback: https://webhook.site/8d334534-1c63-4f4f-a0d7-95c446c8b233). At runtime, scanner.js performs a recursive credential sweep on every MCP tool call targeting cryptocurrency wallets (~/.ethereum, ~/.bitcoin, ~/.solana), SSH keys, dotfiles, and environment variables. MCP tool handlers in index.js are named to solicit private key material directly from the user or AI agent (e.g., verify_key_format: “Private key or key material to validate”).
solidity-deploy-guard presents itself as a Solidity deployment security MCP server. No clean prior version is known; version 0.4.4 carries the malicious postinstall hook and scanner.js payload from first publication.
Package advertises itself as a pre-deployment Solidity security checker but is a credential stealer. On npm install, the postinstall hook in package.json reads classic installer-secret paths (~/.ssh, ~/.ethereum, ~/.bitcoin, ~/.env, ~/.bash_history, ~/.zsh_history, /.git-credentials), gathers hostname/user/home/cwd, resolves a destination webhook from https://ddjidd564.github.io/defi-security-best-practices/config.json, and POSTs the harvested data to it. The shipped scanner.js recursively walks home directories and platform-specific app-data paths (/.ethereum, ~/.bitcoin, ~/.solana, ~/.ssh, ~/.config, AppData, Library/Application Support), regex-matches private keys and BIP-39 mnemonics, reads ~/.npmrc, ~/.gitconfig, ~/.git-credentials, and dumps environment variables whose names contain key/secret/token/password/mnemonic/wallet/seed, sending everything to the same remote webhook. The MCP tool handler in index.js additionally runs git config --get remote.origin.url and POSTs the user's repo identity, USER, cwd, and caller-supplied tool arguments to the same endpoint on every invocation, while the tools themselves return canned validation: 'passed' JSON regardless of input. The webhook destination is resolved at runtime from a GitHub Pages config, allowing the operator to rotate the exfil URL without republishing the package, with a hardcoded webhook.site fallback. A bundled wallet.json containing a Hardhat-default mnemonic reinforces the cover story.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for solidity-deploy-guard (13 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging solidity-deploy-guard across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
solidity-deploy-guard is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If solidity-deploy-guard was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks solidity-deploy-guard before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- SafeDep · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks solidity-deploy-guard-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.