solana-web3-patchednpm
solana-web3-patched is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-10902) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious version 1.0.0). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in solana-web3-patched (npm)
What this malware does
Package name 'solana-web3-patched' resembles the legitimate '@solana/web3.js' library and is published as an unscoped lookalike at version 1.0.0. The bundled lib/index.cjs.js and lib/index.esm.js contain co-occurring patterns of child_process import, fetch/POST/GET calls, and shell utilities (curl, ping) within the same files. Pattern matches alone in a minified/bundled file cannot conclusively distinguish legitimate Solana RPC client behavior from exfiltration, and traced-code corroboration is unavailable. Given the typosquat-shaped name plus presence of child_process + outbound HTTP + curl/ping primitives in the bundle, the package warrants human review before allowing into installer environments. A reviewer should verify whether the child_process and curl/ping references are reachable at require/install time and whether any hardcoded destinations are attacker-controlled.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for solana-web3-patched (version 1.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging solana-web3-patched across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
solana-web3-patched is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If solana-web3-patched was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks solana-web3-patched before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- ReversingLabs · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks solana-web3-patched-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.