sn-flow-clientnpm
Malicious code in sn-flow-client (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
package.json declares a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node index.js") that runs index.js automatically on npm install. index.js requires child_process, os, http, and https, then collects installer host identity — os.hostname(), process.platform, os.arch(), os.homedir(), os.userInfo() (username/uid/gid/shell), and the output of whoami / id / cwd via child_process — and POSTs the collected JSON to https://ypraooa298eigl12zisuxg2f76dx1npc.oastify.com/detox56. oastify.com is the Burp Collaborator out-of-band interaction domain; the random subdomain is an attacker-controlled OAST listener. The package has empty author/description/license metadata, no legitimate functionality, and a plausibly-internal-sounding name (sn-flow-client) — consistent with a dependency-confusion probe rather than a real client library. Installing this package causes immediate outbound transmission of installer host/user identifiers to an attacker-controlled endpoint with no user consent.
The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'sn-flow-client' @ 10.10.10 (npm) as malicious.
It is considered malicious because:
- The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for sn-flow-client (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging sn-flow-client across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove sn-flow-client from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If sn-flow-client was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks sn-flow-client before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- OpenSSF: Package Analysis · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks sn-flow-client-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.