sm-checkoutnpm
sm-checkout is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-14397) that opens a backdoor for remote access (malicious versions 99.0.0, 99.0.1). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in sm-checkout (npm)
What this malware does
[email protected] declares preinstall and postinstall lifecycle scripts in package.json that invoke curl against a hardcoded bare-IP URL over plain HTTP (http://16.192.173.5/sm-checkout/pre and http://16.192.173.5/sm-checkout/post) on npm install. The inflated 99.0.0 version is calibrated to win semver resolution against a private package of the same name, and the lifecycle callbacks confirm successful execution on any host that mistakenly resolves the public name, leaking the installer's source IP and install timing to the operator of 16.192.173.5. A source comment self-labels the package as a dependency-confusion test; the labelling does not change that the artifact runs an unauthenticated outbound beacon on every install in build systems and developer machines that pull it.
The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'sm-checkout' @ 99.0.1 (npm) as malicious.
It is considered malicious because:
- The package executes one or more commands associated with malicious behavior.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for sm-checkout (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging sm-checkout across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
sm-checkout establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If sm-checkout was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks sm-checkout before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- OpenSSF: Package Analysis · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks sm-checkout-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.