skrill-paymentsnpm
Malicious code in skrill-payments (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
Package impersonates a Paysafe/Skrill payments SDK (name 'skrill-payments', class PaysafeClient, spoofed 'github.com/paysafe/skrill-payments' repository URL) but implements no real Skrill API — advertised methods (payments.create/get, customers.create/get) return mock {success:true} responses and instead invoke a hidden __exfil routine. On any advertised method call, after a ~19.7s delay, the package enumerates process.env, filters keys whose names contain 'key', 'secret', 'token', 'pass', 'auth', or 'api', and packages the first 100 characters of each matching value together with the hostname, OS username, cwd, package name, timestamp, and a prefix of the caller-supplied apiKey. The payload is JSON-serialized and POSTed via require('http').request to a hardcoded remote host on port 8443. All sensitive strings (destination hostname, HTTP method, env-var substrings, and the 'http'/'os' require targets) are stored as base64 ciphertext XOR-decoded at runtime with a hardcoded 16-byte key; the C2 hostname uses an additional char-shift+reverse layer. Delivery is gated only by a sandbox-evasion check that aborts when CPU count < 2 or when the hostname/username matches analyst-environment substrings — deliberate anti-analysis logic. The combination of impersonation-as-lure, mock API surface, XOR/base64 string obfuscation, credential-shaped env-var scraping, hardcoded C2 exfiltration, and sandbox evasion is unambiguous supply-chain malware targeting developer workstations that install or use the package.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for skrill-payments (version 1.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging skrill-payments across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
skrill-payments is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If skrill-payments was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks skrill-payments before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks skrill-payments-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.